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Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANET) are becoming popular due to the emergence of the Internet of 
Things and ambient intelligence applications. In such networks, secure resource sharing functionality is 
accomplished by incorporating trust schemes. Current solutions adopt peer-to-peer technologies that can 
cover the large operational area. However, these systems fail to capture some inherent properties of 
VANETs, such as fast and ephemeral interaction, making robust trust evaluation of crowdsourcing 
challenging. In this article, we propose MobileTrust – a hybrid trust-based system for secure resource 
sharing in VANETs. The proposal is a breakthrough in centralized trust computing that utilizes cloud and 
upcoming 5G technologies in order to provide robust trust establishment with global scalability. The ad hoc 
communication is energy-efficient and protects the system against threats that are not countered by the 
current settings. To evaluate its performance and effectiveness, MobileTrust is modelled in the SUMO 
simulator and tested on the traffic features of the small-size German city of Eichstatt. Similar schemes are 
implemented in the same platform in order to provide a fair comparison. Moreover, MobileTrust is deployed 
on a typical embedded system platform and applied on a real smart car installation for monitoring traffic and 
road-state parameters of an urban application. The proposed system is developed under the EU-founded 
THREAT-ARREST project, to provide security, privacy, and trust in an intelligent and energy-aware 
transportation scenario, bringing closer the vision of sustainable circular economy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this era of the 4thIndustrial revolution, Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications influence our daily 
activities, with the cyber-physical systems (CPS) market value reaching the 8,120 million dollars 
in 2021 [1]. Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) constitute a special type of mobile 
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networking in this domain [2], [3], [4], [5]. They include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
roadside infrastructure (V2I) communication for providing, among others, traffic information, 
navigation, safety, or other services [6], [7]. 
In the recent year, several circular economy (CE) initiatives are emerging, penetrating also in 
the VANET domain. Quality-of-Service (QoS) and energy-aware solutions that serve numerous 
users and devices, enhance the design perspectives towards CE, creating looping assets and 
maximizing the utilization of resources, like ridesharing [8]. Other interesting proposals for 
intelligent transportation include smart traffic control, ride service hailing, or even car-sharing. 
The USA standard IEEE 1609 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) is built on 
IEEE 802.11p [9], [10]. It operates in 5.9 GHz frequency and supports multi-channel 
communication, security, and lightweight application layer protocols. The relevant European 
standard ETSI ITS G5 [11] operates in the same band, implementing multi-radio multi-channel 
functionality, security, and a complex hierarchy of higher layer protocols that integrate a broad 
range of main services. 
This paper focuses on the security aspects of VANET ecosystems. The aforementioned 
standards cover coarse and generic security serviceswhere cryptographic primitives are utilized to 
accomplish the properties of authentication, authorization, confidentiality, and integrity.However, 
the VANET problem domain constitutes a field of security challenges arising from the violation 
of the fair use by selfish or malicious participants [12]. Selfish entities may attemptto avoid the 
additional computational or communication effort from contributing to the collective operations 
of the social network. Malicious entities exploit the system’s vulnerabilities and rating 
mechanisms to launch attacks, like Denial of Service (DoS), Byzantine failures, or interception of 
normal interaction by injecting fake information. 
As such, trust-based computing approach must be adopted [13], [14]. The underlying 
techniques aim toevaluatethe participants’ activity in order to detect security policy violation 
attempts and in which case countermeasures would beenforced that restrict or banthe involving 
entities. The goal is to encourage the legitimate nodes in keeping up withtheir positive 
contribution, discourage and penalise the selfish and malicious participants from misbehaving, 
and protect the wholeinfrastructurefromattacks. 
This paper presents a trust-based resource sharing system for VANETS, called MobileTrust. 
The system is built upon the aforementioned main security functionality (i.e. IEEE 802.11p[10], 
ETSI ITS G5[11]) and its main contribution is to evaluate the entities’ behavioronce the 
cryptographically secure communication is achieved. As a case-study, we considered the scenario 
where vehicles and smart city infrastructure components exchange information regarding traffic 
congestion and other road events. A simulation study is conducting in the Simulation of Urban 
MObility (SUMO)1 for the evaluation of the main protection and performance properties of our 
proposal, and the comparison with relevant systems under the same setting. A real 
implementation is alsodeployed on embedded devices and Android smart phones that emulate the 
sensors and the communication equipment of a smart vehicle. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related workin the 
domain. Section 3 presents MobileTrust. Section 4 describes the theoretic analysis. Sections 5 
shows the simulation analysis and the comparison of our proposal with the current solutions. 
Section 6 details the real implementation of MobileTrust on embedded devices. Finally, Section 7 
concludes and refers future work. 
2 RELATED WORK 
                                                                
1SUMO: http://www.dlr.de/ts/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-9883/16931_read-41000/ 
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In the context of VANETs, trust-based interactions occur at high speeds and short time periods 
[13]. The knowledge integration algorithm should exhibit low complexity constraints, such as 
effective throughput, fast memory access, and cost-efficient processing. Scalability is a main 
concern, as incidents or road events could be reported either by single mobile nodes or by 
multiple vehicles. 
General attacks on mobile ad hoc networks are surveyed in [15] and [16]. Furthermore, 
VANETs are vulnerable to false positioning, message modification, false message sending, and 
DoS [14]. Trust-based schemes are deployed as a main countermeasure against most of these 
threats. Inevitably, the formal trust evaluation processes are targeted by more sophisticated 
attackers [17]. The involved challenges of trust management in VANETs are reviewed in [18] and 
[19]. 
2.1 Trust-Based Resource Management 
Several trust-based schemes have been proposed in the literature attempting to tackle resource 
management. For this study, we focus on these systems that collect and process information in 
real-time for a VANET setting. 
The Vehicle Ad hoc network Reputation System (VARS) [20] is one of the first attempts to 
incorporate trust-based computing in the field of VANETs. It forms a modular and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) reputation system that separates direct and indirect information when integrating 
knowledge. The system rests its confidence on the distributed content itself rather on the node 
behavior. The forwarding nodes attach in the transmitted message their opinion about the content 
(e.g. traffic congestion on a road segment or blocked route). The receiver utilizes the 
contextualized data to evaluate the trustworthiness of the message. A node’s opinion about an 
event can be formed by direct knowledge, indirect knowledge sent by a known sender, partially 
by the attached opinions on the message by the forwarding nodes, or by a combination of all these 
interactions. A main performance drawback of VARS is the fact that the communication 
bandwidth is substantially affected due to the overheads from the information that is cumulatively 
appended along the communication path when a high number of forwarding nodes is involved. 
Furthermore, the proposed approach does not enforce authentication, thus making the system 
vulnerable to attacks from simple modification to complete deletion of messages. 
The Event-based Reputation System (ERS) [21] attempts to detect inaccurate traffic events and 
deter attackers from spreading false messages. Traffic information is collected from the vehicles 
and the road infrastructure. The system utilizes distributed observations and tries to figure out if a 
traffic event really exits and how long it lasts. The information of an event is maintained in a table 
by every vehicle that becomes aware of the incident, either by direct interaction or indirect 
notifications. The event table stores data regarding the event’s identity, type, occurrence, location, 
message transmission range, reputation, and indirect confidence list. One main scalability 
problem that arises is the difficulty in managing the confidence lists for all events that are 
reported in the network. Also, the simple evaluation process of indirect notifications makes the 
system vulnerable to attackers that perform badmouthing (advertise bad recommendations for 
legitimate nodes) and ballot-stuffing (gain good reports from colluding malicious entities) [17]. 
Moreover, as ERS requires a significant amount of contributions in order to designate that an 
event has occurred, it fails when it comes to the early and timely notification of drivers regarding 
the existence of an accident on the road ahead. However, the safety of drivers is an essential goal 
towards the real deployment of VANETs ([18], [19]). 
The Trust Based Security Enhancement (TBSE) for VANETs [22] is designed upon the core 
cryptographic techniques and acts as a second defense mechanism against inside attackers. Both 
direct and indirect knowledge are utilized for the trust estimations. Direct interaction is evaluated 
based on the Bayesian rule. For the rating of the third-party recommendations, the Dempster-
Shafer Theory (DST) [23] is employed, allowing the probabilistic assessment of the truthfulness 
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of an event in the presence of uncertainty. Then, the calculated trust values are stored in a 
repository where upper layer applications can gain access and utilize this information in order to 
achieve their security goals, like secure resource sharing or routing. However, the attacker model 
is restricted to a low number of malicious entities that do not collude with each other. Passive 
attacks are also not studied. Moreover, TBSE is vulnerable to information cascading and 
oversampling [24]. In cascading, a decision is madeby the nodes deciding sequentially after 
observing the behavior of the other participants. Therefore, a node’s choice is highly influenced 
by the previous decisions that can overrule its own observation. Oversampling occurs when a 
node receives the opinion of nodes i and j, but j’s opinion has been initially influenced by the 
decision of i. Thus, the contributing information by j is oversampled. 
A Social Network approach to Trust Management (SNTM) in VANETs is presented in [24]. 
The main contribution of this study is the limitation of the bad effects from information cascading 
and oversampling in P2P communication. SNTM tackles directly cascading by assigning higher 
voting weight to the vehicles that are closer to the event. As the influence from cascading is 
eliminated and the result becomes more accurate, the potential oversampling is also limited 
indirectly. The nodes also attach their opinion regarding an event in the message. The receivers 
contrast this knowledge with their own opinion. Then, they rate the other contributors and 
estimate the message’s quality. 
2.2 Discussion 
Centralized trust evaluation was not considered an appropriate architecture for VANETs by the 
research community due to scalability issues attributed to the high computational and 
communicational burden on a central entity, as well as dependability concerns as this central 
entity would be a single point of failure [24]. The design of P2P architectures seemed as a one-
way approach towards the establishment of mobile trust. All the aforementioned related works 
promote the P2P paradigm. However, in order to build effective and trustworthy P2P 
relationships, one would need a significant and frequent amount of interactions between the peers. 
Thus, these studies fail to capture some inherent properties of VANETs. The ephemeral nature of 
such networks does not veritably facilitate the P2P trust. Moreover, trust is not necessarily 
transitive and the gathering of information from past interaction, by each peer for every other 
participant, is computationally expensive and even impossible under realistic assumptions. As the 
vehicles drive in high speeds, when the selection and processing of the proper knowledge for an 
event are completed, the outcome is no longer required, as the vehicle has either faced, dealt with 
or bypassed the reported problem. P2P trust will inevitably become vulnerable to information 
cascading and oversampling in an actual setting. 
Authentication and cryptographic security is another important issue. A number of studies (e.g. 
[20], [21]) ignored or overlooked the implications of cryptographic communication and the 
overheads from supporting this essential functionality in P2P networks. On the other hand, when 
peer authentication is implemented, privacy issues arise as a vehicle publishes data regarding its 
driving route or other user sensitive information [25]. 
The evolution of cloud computing and the upcoming 5G technologies, like Multi-access Edge 
Computing (MEC) [26], [27] can help towards overcoming the restrictions of both centralized and 
P2P trust in the VANETs domain. This study proposes a hybrid trust algorithm where both types 
of interaction are utilized. Theoretical results regarding the scalability of hybrid P2P systems for 
data distribution are reported in [28]. The core trust calculation and maintenance is performed in a 
centralized manner, focusing equally on the data correctness and the evaluation of the nodes’ 
behavior. Nevertheless, the obstacles of centralized knowledge integration are overcome by 
distributing and parallelizing the related computations in the cloud and MEC. The internal 
computations are further parallelized in Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), enhancing the overall 
performance. 
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Authenticated users contribute with first-hand observations. Only the central authority 
integrates this knowledge and reports the existing road events, eliminating the bad effects of 
cascading and oversampling. In order to decrease the centralized communication, the peers can 
broadcast this timely- and spatial-sensitive data that are digitally signed by the authority, without 
requiring to authenticate each other, and thus, preserving their privacy between the vehicle nodes. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed setting. In short, the proposed MobileTrust system aims to offer: 
 Efficient centralized knowledge integration, exploiting the capabilities of cloud 
computing, MEC, and GPUs 
 Effective trust computation of authenticated users in a centralized manner, capturing the 
inheriting properties of VANETs (e.g. ephemeral environment, time-sensitive 
information, different sensing capabilities, and safety response) 
 High accuracy in estimating the presence of a road event, even in the presence of 
malicious entities 
 Preservation of P2P privacy 
 Secure cryptographic communication in all transactions 
 DoS resilience 
The overall setting provides efficient, effective, and timely accurate information, countering a 
high variety of attacks and offering secure and privacy-preserving communication. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The MobileTrust design approach. 
3 MobileTrust 
This section details the MobileTrust design. The system integrates first-hand information from the 
involving participants. The trustworthiness of each contributing node is taken into consideration 
during this process. The contributors are authenticated while privacy is preserved in the P2P 
interaction. The overall setting presupposes that there exists a safe procedure to register/identify 
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the participating vehicles in order to prevent the attackers from introducing virtual vehicles that 
transmit bogus data. The potential towards global scalability is also presented. The assignment of 
the constant coefficients for the reputation and trust computations (e.g. the reputation rating 
values or the trust integrating weights) is based on relevant studies ([20], [21], [22], [24]) and in a 
previous analysis that the authors have conducted under a similar setting [37]. 
3.1 Knowledge Integration 
Three reputation resources are considered by direct interaction, notices send by trustworthy public 
authorities, and notifications made by a centralized entity. The following event types (E) are 
modelled: i) Road accidents, ii) Traffic congestion, iii) Bad road conditions, iv) Working 
activities, v) Protest, ceremony, military, religious, athletic, or other march, vi) Route diversion by 
police, vii) Blocked road (i.e.  by physical obstacle), viii) General alarm to draw the drivers’ 
attention and be cautious. 
When a major event is reported, the nodes that are located closer and reckoned sooner can 
contribute with data having a higher level of accuracy. These advantageous geo location reporters 
gain higher reputation values, if the transmitted data is confirmed. 
Based on the evaluation result, a message can be rejected, accepted but not integrated, or 
accepted and integrated. Messages originating from untrusted nodes or those who report events 
that are not close to the nodes’ location are rejected and the involving nodes are rated negatively. 
For the traffic report application, the vehicles must collect information regarding their speed. 
The road routes are segmented, for example every 500m. A vehicle calculates its average speed in 
each crossed segment. If the speed falls under a threshold, the vehicle indicates the segment as 
congested. When a decent amount of similar indications are received by the backend component 
(see the text below), the application reports the traffic congestion. If there are no incoming 
indications, the congestion report for a segment fades as time elapses, until it is assigned as 
normal again. MobileTrust bounds the misbehavior of a malicious vehicle from arbitrarily 
reporting segments as congested. The attacker will be rated negatively as long as his indications 
will not be supported by other participants. 
The events of working activities, protest or other marches, route diversion by the police, 
blocked road segment, or general alarm are manually designated by the driver. Moreover, the 
backend application can be informed in advance for such events by the involving authorities, 
which are considered trustworthy. For example, the municipality can report the scheduled 
working activities or athletic events, which are then imported into the system. 
The centralized trust management component performs the following steps: 
1. The first notification of an event ∈  on a road section rs creates a new event entry with 
neutral confidence (the value depends on the node’s overall trustworthiness and its 
reputation in observing the specific event type). 
2. As other nodes located in the same road section advocate that the event is ongoing (by 
sending the same notification type as in step 1), the confidence that the event is actually 
happening increases. 
3. The confidence Crs,e is calculated as the ratio of the contributing nodes (contrrs,e) to the 
nodes that enter the road section (passingrs). It is defined in (1) as: 
 
, = 
, ⇒ 
0% − 50%, (50% − 70%,  !(70% − 100%, ℎℎ $ (1) 
 
4. Incoming vehicles are notified about the active events in advance, before entering the 
road section. The reported event’s confidence fades as time elapses and no new 
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notifications are made, to designate that the event is smoothing out (i.e. 10% decrement 
for every minute that passes while the incoming vehicles do not notice the event). 
5. The event entry is terminated after a fixed-time period (i.e. 5 minutes) to prevent the case 
where an attacker sends the same notification over-and-over in order to keep the entry 
active. 
6. Then, the nodes that cross the road section are evaluated. The nodes gain a reputation 
rate according to the events maximum level of confidence that was achieved during the 
active period. 
a. The contributing nodes gain negative (-4), neutral (0), and positive (+1) 
reputation values r for low, moderate, and high level of confidence, 
respectively. In the last case, the first responders (2% of the total contributors) 
are awarded with an extra bonus score (+1). 
b. Similarly, the non-contributing nodes are rated negatively (-4) if the event 
gained moderate or high confidence (based on equation (1)) in order to detect 
selfish nodes, otherwise they are ranked neutrally (0). 
c. Also, the system ranks negatively (-4) the nodes that remain constantly in a 
road segment and report events (i.e. traffic jam) while the majority of the 
entering nodes continue their route, in an attempt to force the malicious nodes 
to be in continuous move and be unable to target distinct road segments. 
7. If notifications are sent after the active period, a new event entry is created (step 1). 
3.2 The Trust Framework 
For every user, MobileTrust evaluates his/hers trustworthiness based on the past interaction. All 
new users start with neutral trust and reputation values (0), which are continuously updated as 
new pieces of knowledge are integrated. 
MobileTrust maintains a small history of the latest evaluation results for each event type. The 
history size (he) is determined by the event’s frequency, ranging from 500 ranks for traffic 
monitoring to 30 ranks for the user defined reports (e.g. blocked road segments or protest march). 
Reputation fading is applied for each event type, based on a beta distribution [29], by assigning 
higher weights (fading_wi) to the most recent interactions. The reputation value of the user for a 
specific event type, R(User, e), is the average weighted summation of the relevant historical values, 
as defined in (2): 
 
%(&,   ) = ) * × ,!_*
./
*01
ℎ2  (2) 
 
This information determines the effectiveness of a user in reporting a specific type of event. 
Thus, the system can discriminate the different sensing capabilities of the various nodes and 
exploit this knowledge (if the reputation value is for example >0.5), especially when an event has 
been just reported or in road segments with few contributors. Moreover, the system can detect a 
malfunction in the sensing equipment or a malicious activity that tries to manipulate the rating 
mechanism for a specific event type (i.e. when the reputation value decreases beyond a threshold 
of 0.4) and not integrate the relevant contributions. 
Trust estimates the overall cooperativeness of a user. Each event reputation gains a weight (we) 
based on the event’s frequency and severity. Traffic monitoring and road accident reports are 
assigned with a weight of 0.30 and the rest types are assigned with a weight of 0.1 (the weights 
summation is equal to 1.0). The trustworthiness for a user, TUser, is then calculated by aggregating 
the underlying reputation values, as defined in (3): 
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A user with a trust level that exceeds 0.8 or 0.6 is considered trusted and legitimate, 
respectively. When the trust falls beyond a threshold (i.e. ≤0.5), the user is notified for his/hers 
misbehavior and is categorized as suspicious. If the cooperation level keeps degrading (i.e. ≤0.4), 
the node is finally reported as malicious and is expelled from the network. 
3.3 Authentication and Privacy 
In order to maintain the reputation records and operate in a trustworthy manner, the users that 
contribute information to MobileTrust must be authenticated. Each driver creates an account with 
a username/password pair (or other mean of authentication, like near-field communication (NFC), 
Bluetooth pairing, etc.) and logs on the system through the vehicle’s infotainment system 
(SSL/TLS communication). Only authenticated users can send information to the application 
through a secure channel. The data are encrypted with a symmetric session key (such as AES) and 
through an appropriate protocol such as SSL/TLS. 
Furthermore, passive anonymous use is also supported. The notifications that are reported by 
MobileTrust are signed with the authority’s private asymmetric key (RSA). To reserve resources, 
all active notifications for a road segment are included in the signed message. Thus, every node 
can verify the central authority, as its public asymmetric key is known to all participants. 
However, it should be stated that a high volume of anonymous users who do not contribute with 
any information, could degrade the effectiveness of the system in the presence of attackers (as 
detailed in the theoretic analysis subsection 4.2). 
A main contribution of the overall setting is the privacy protection of the V2V interaction. In 
order to preserve privacy, the nodes exchange only the publicly-signed notifications. Thus, if a 
vehicle requests information regarding some road segments, the other vehicles or the road 
infrastructure will respond with the relevant messages that have been previously retrieved by the 
central authority, without requiring to authenticate each other. Both the request and the response 
are broadcasted messages in a P2P communication of the nearby nodes. 
The notification format, as described in (4), is consisted of the road segment’s ID, the event 
type, the date (timestamp) where the event occurred, and a sequence number (bounded to a 
specific segment ID and event type, and initialized every day when the date is changed). This 
information is both included in the encrypted data and also sent in plaintext along with the rest of 
the message. To preserve resources, the nodes maintain only the latest notifications of each event 
type for a road segment. Moreover, a node deletes the older messages of passed segments as time-
elapses and the events’ active period terminates (i.e. after 5 minutes) in order to keep the memory 
usage profile low. 
 NotiBication format: Road segment ID | Event type | Date | Sequence no.  (4) 
 
The plaintext notification identifier is utilized as an automatic access control tag to degrade the 
effectiveness of DoS attacks at the responder and requester ends. A request message is 
unencrypted and contains road segment IDs. The responder examines the included road segment 
IDs and broadcasts the latest related notifications. If irrelevant segments are included, the node 
discards the message and does not proceed in any further actions. The node also adheres to a 
threshold for a maximum number of request responds in the current time window (i.e. at most ten 
responds per minute) as an additional measure against DoS by bogus request messages. 
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A response message replays the public notifications, as they were retrieved by the central 
authority. For each incoming response, the requester examines the plaintext notification identifier. 
The node automatically recognizes the relevant notifications by examining the road segment ID 
and the timestamp. Then, it checks the sequence number and evaluates the newest notification 
version. The node decrypts the message with the authority’s public key. If the decryption and the 
integrity check (SHA512) are successful, the node integrates the notification. Otherwise, the node 
proceeds to the older received versions of the notification. However, an attacker can still send 
erroneous messages with a valid notification identifier and a high sequence number in order to 
enforce the requester to perform the decryption operation. Thus, if several decryption attempts fail 
in a time interval (e.g. five fails in the last minute), the node turns in back-off mode for a while, 
until the vehicle drives away from the region. The user can later login the system and report the 
road segments where the malicious activity was observed. 
3.4 Vehicle Registration 
Except from authenticating the active users through the proposed application, we must also 
enforce a procedure to examine that he/she is driving a real vehicle. Otherwise, a malicious entity 
could create several user accounts for virtual vehicles, which would later launch coordinated 
sophisticated attacks on-line by sending fake positioning information along with erroneous road 
events. This is a general problem that affects all VANET settings (e.g. [20], [21], [22], [24]). An 
indicative case is the money laundering scam in Uber2. Collaborating drivers log in the system 
through a virtual machine (VM) which emulates a fake-GPS service. Users/payers find these 
taxicabs via specific marketplaces in the dark-web and hire services that they do not actually use, 
laundering money in the process. 
Identification and authentication of a vehicle is out of scope for this study and MobileTrust 
presupposes that the smart vehicle industry will deploy such an identification mechanism. 
Nonetheless, a basic protection approach is sketched. Each manufacturer nowadays assigns a 
unique identifier for each produced vehicle, known as the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)3. 
VIN is composed of 17 digits and acts as the vehicle’s fingerprint. For the modern smart 
functionality, the manufacturer (or another trusted party) can sign and provide the vehicle owner 
with a digital certificate. The certificate will contain VIN and other vehicle-related information. 
Then, MobileTrust or other smart applications can obtain this data through the user’s equipment 
and check the existence of the mobile node. The application can also interact with the signing 
entity in order to evaluate the certification’s validity (e.g. if it has been revoked).Except from 
VIN, if the vehicle is equipped with a modern Electronic License Plate (ELP)4, the related data 
could be also utilized for the same purpose. 
The overall process can be further enhanced with the analysis that is performed by popular 
Internet services and social media (i.e. Gmail and Facebook).For security purposes, they can 
record the set of devices with which the user usually logs onto the system and try to keep out 
intruders that have disclosed the user’s credentials. 
3.5 Towards Global Scalability 
Centralized architectures were considered, in general, disadvantageous in comparison to P2P 
settings, as they constitute a single point of processing and a bottleneck [13], [24]. However, 
cloud and fog computing is now providing several solutions regarding efficiency and 
dependability [30]. 
                                                                
2Uber laundering money scam: https://bdtechtalks.com/2018/03/21/fraudsters-uber-money-laundering/ 
3
 Vehicle Identification Number (VIN): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle_identification_number 
4
 Electronic License Plate (ELP): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_license_plate 
39:10  George Hatzivasilis et al. 
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, Vol. 4, No. 2, Article 39. Publication date: October 2019. 
The component of MobileTrust that performs all the computational intensive operations is the 
central authority. Nevertheless, VANETs and the proposed trust algorithm exhibit some inherited 
design properties that enable distribution, parallelization and global scalability. First of all, each 
authenticated user/driver is located in a specific region at each time point, and, usually, drives 
around a particular geographic location most of the time. Secondly, the processed data are region 
dependent. Thus, the knowledge integration of each road segment can be parallelized in a fine-
grained manner. 
The IT industry that provides cloud services installs several datacenters in each continent 
around the globe. The application traffic is routed to the nearest datacenter based on the IP 
address. Load balancing among the datacenters is delivered by the cloud provider [31]. Thus, the 
traffic from a country is transmitted to specific datacenters. The user data can be also maintained 
in an efficient and distributed manner in the cloud, similarly to an email service, a social network, 
or other global-scale applications [32]. 
The MobileTrust data gathering and integration algorithm can be further parallelized based on 
the road segments. Each hired parallel processing unit in a datacenter can perform the trust 
computations of a single or a group of nearby road segments. The processing units can read data 
from a pool and serve the incoming traffic completely independent from each other. Each core 
processes data buckets, where each bucket contains the information for a distinct event entry. As 
mentioned earlier, the event entries in a road segment remain active for a fixed-time period, for 
example 5 minutes. Then, the core updates the trust profiles of the contributing users. GPU-
processing can decrease the overall processing time. 
Additionally, MEC technologies [26] can further reduce the communication delay. The parallel 
processing can be installed closer to the smart road infrastructure and drastically reduce the 
round-trip time (Fig. 1). 
4 THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
This section details the theoretical analysis of the proposed approach and its effectiveness in 
countering the attacker models that are detailed in the simulation study (Section 5). The overall 
analysis is based on the ordinary assumption that the mainstream cryptographic primitives (i.e. 
TLS, RSA, AES, and SHA512) are implemented and configured properly, and thus, their usage is 
considered theoretically secure. At first, we examine the security aspects that are provided by the 
deployed communication protocols. Then, we give proofs regarding the capabilities of 
MobileTrust in supporting the legitimate functionality in presence of attackers. 
4.1 Protocol Analysis 
The theoretic security analysis of the communication links between the involved entities and the 
MobileTrust component is modelled in the verification tool ProVerif [33] (the code is not 
included for brevity). It is a widely-used automatic symbolic protocol verifier that proves the 
security properties of the examined protocol, like authentication, secrecy, and adversary 
equivalence aspects. The examined protocol is modelled in a process calculus and is automatically 
translated in Horn clauses [33]. The tool resolves these clauses and determines if the security 
properties hold or not. In case where all properties are validated, ProVerif returns “true”. 
Otherwise, it outputs the properties that could not be satisfied. Three communication protocols are 
examined: 
1. The user/vehicle login and knowledge transfer towards the Central Authority 
(CA) 
2. Road segment notification requests from a vehicle to the CA 
3. Road segment notification requests from a vehicle to another vehicle (P2P) 
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4.1.1 User login and contribution. 
community, the driver has to authenticate him/herself and enter the system. This includes an 
ordinary login process where the user inputs a pair of username/
connection via HTTPS [34]. The CA safely receives the data and verifies the user.
The communication is initiated by the user. The user application and the CA perform the 
handshake phase. The application obtains the CA’s 
two entities agree upon a randomly generated symmetric session key.
From this point on, the transmitted data are encrypted with the common key as in the 
record phase. The user is prompted to provide his
the user’s credentials (e.g. username, password’s digest, etc.). The CA decrypts it, checks the 
message’s integrity (HMAC-SHA256) and uniqueness, and contrasts the received information 
with the credentials that are maintained in an internal database. If the process is successful, the 
user is authenticated and can upload the evidence for ongoing road events. Then, the CA performs 
MobileTrust and evaluates the user’s cooperation. Fig. 
 
Fig. 2. User’s login and knowledge contribution.
  39:
2019
In order to actively participate in the MobileTrust 
password through a SSL/TLS
 
TLS
digital certificate (X.509) and validates it. The 
 
TLS
/hers data (e.g. [35]). The login request contains 
2 depicts the communication steps. 
 
 
11 
. 
 
 
 
39:12 
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, Vol. 4, No. 2, Article 39. Publication date: October 2019
The two entities began with the establishment of the secure channel (
Then, they utilized the derived session key and encrypt the rest exchanged messages (
record). ProVerif evaluates the abovementioned protocol steps 
of the sensed data from the user to the CA) 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and immunity to replay attacks.
 
4.1.2 Notification requests. Every user can ask the CA for the active event notification list of 
specific neighboring road segments. If the user is logged in, then the communication can be 
encrypted by the session key. Otherwise, the user can make unauthenticate
his/her privacy. 
The request contains the required road segment ids and is encrypted with the CA’s public key. 
The digest of the data is also computed (SHA512) 
verifies the message’s integrity. The respon
nonce. The data digest is computed and then signed with CA’s private key. The user re
the digest of the received data and decrypts the signature with the CA’s public key. Fig. 
illustrates the exchanged messages. 
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Fig. 3. Notification requests and anonymous use. 
 
ProVerif validates that the communication is safe and provides CA authentication, integrity, 
and immunity to replay attacks. As described in the previous sections, full protection is not 
required here, as the road event notifications are meant to be publicly available. 
 
4.1.3 P2P interaction. Nevertheless, a vehicle can request information about the neighboring 
road segments by the nearby vehicles. The requester sends the segment id list in plaintext along 
with the message’s digest. The contributors check the message’s integrity and respond with the 
related active notifications that they possess. The requester verifies the received notifications’ 
legitimacy as in the previous case. The protocol’s phases are similar with the relevant steps that 
are depicted in the second part of Fig. 3 for the anonymous communication between the user and 
the CA, with the initial request being an unencrypted broadcast message. 
As before, the tool verifies that the interaction accomplishes the CA authentication, integrity, 
and immunity to replay attacks. Moreover, the contributors’ privacy is retained as no user-
/vehicle-related data is disclosed. 
4.2 Attack Mitigation 
The theoretical security analysis of the trust computing mechanisms and its effectiveness in 
constraining the malicious activity is performed in two steps. First, we prove that the integration 
of malicious knowledge is bounded (Theorem 4.1). Then, we argue that MobileTrust’s efficacy is 
strongly related with the active participation of the legitimate users (Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 
4.2). The proposed defense mechanism increases significantly the effort that must be devoted by 
the attacker in order to exploit the system (Lemma 4.2). Finally, we evince that the system can 
provide protection even without the full participation of all legitimate users that may want to 
retain their privacy (Lemma 4.3). 
For the system model, we form a VANET with N nodes, such as V={1, 2, …, N}. It is assumed 
that all links are bidirectional. If node i can receive packets that are directly transmitted by node j, 
then node j can receive packets that are directly transmitted by node i. The nodes are either 
vehicles or smart road infrastructure. Since the majority of these nodes are vehicles, the network 
dynamics are characterized by confined mobility, high speeds, and thus, short connection times 
between the nodes. The operational area can be very large, but the V2V communications are 
mainly local and the currently processed information for each node concerns specific road 
segments and not the whole network. Information regarding the examined road events is collected 
and exchanged by each node, either with other nodes or with the CA. Vehicles can travel freely, 
but in most cases, they have a relatively fixed route, such as buses. 
Due to the complexity of a VANET system, several types of attacks can be performed. For the 
adversary model, we consider that attackers are internal nodes (malicious or compromised) that 
send out fraudulent event messages: they notify unreal events (i.e. traffic jam while the road 
segment is not congested) and if an event exists, they do not send any message to the authority 
denoting the incident (mislead the trust mechanism into producing false negativesin the case 
where a smaller number of legitimate nodes have reported the events). They are global attackers 
(have an overall coverage of the network and can eavesdrop every message diffused by any 
vehicle), who can be either active or passive. Legitimate nodes can also malfunction with a low 
probability and perform the same actions for a while (i.e. Byzantine faults [36]). 
We start by providing some definitions and then the theorems and the proofs. 
Definition 3.1. Let 
Z,  be the total number of correct event notifications that are 
reported to the CA for a specific event e in a road segment rs. 
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Definition 3.2. Let 
[,  be the total number of erroneous event notifications that are 
reported to the CA for a specific event in a road segment. 
Definition 3.3. Let Tcontrrs,e be the total number of received event notifications for a specific 
event in a road segment, determined as the sum of 
Z, and 
[,. 
Definition 3.4. Let p be the success rate of the total received event notifications Tcontrrs,e. 
 
4.2.1 The bounded malicious effect.  
THEOREM 4.1. As the contributing users are authenticated, they can send information for a 
specific region at each time point. The ideal network exhibits ∑ 
[,∈]^,∈_ −  ∙∑ 
Z,∈]^,∈_ ≤ 0 . For up to an additive constant, ignoring a bounded number φ of 
erroneous notifications, it holds that the number of erroneous notifications is a p-fraction of the 
number of received notifications. Specifically, there exists an upper bound φ, as described in (5): 
 ) 
[,∈]^,∈_ −  ∙ ) 
Z,∈]^,∈_ ≤ b (5) 
 
PROOF. Suppose that there exist N nodes in the network V, M of which are malicious with 
M<N. Let MRS denote the set of road segments RS that contain malicious nodes. The maximum 
value for MRS is RS (if there is at least one M in every  ∈ %c). 
Let β denote the number of erroneous notifications that exposes a node as malicious. The 
number of convictions convrs is at least ∑ 
[,∈d]^,∈_ e⁄ . Thus,  
 ∑ 
[,∈d]^,∈_e − ) 
g∈d]^ < 0 (6) 
 
Similarly, the number of rewards rewrs is at most 
∑ i5:6jkl,/kl∈mno,/∈pq <⁄ . Thus,  
 
) ∈d]^ −
∑ 
Z,∈d]^,∈_e ⁄ < 0 (7) 
 
Therefore, 
 ∑ 
[,∈d]^,∈_e − ∑ 
Z,∈d]^,∈_e ⁄  ≤ ) (
g − )∈d]^  
(8) 
 
By combining (5) and (8), we derive: 
 ) 
[,∈d]^,∈_ −  ∙ ) 
Z,∈d]^,∈_≤ e ) (
g − )∈d]^ ≤ e ∙ r ∙ r%c 
(9) 
 
Therefore, the malicious activity which affects the network is bounded. If there are no 
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malicious nodes (M=0), then (9) describes the ideal case of ∑ 
−,∈%c,∈ −  ∙∑ 
+,∈%c,∈ ≤ 0. ■ 
 
4.2.2 Correlation between the legitimate user’s participation and the robust deduction 
procedure of MobileTrust. 
LEMMA  4.1. The MobileTrust’s evaluation mechanism can decrease the attack rate. 
PROOF. Consider Mup and Mmt as the number of malicious nodes per window for an unprotected 
(up) network and a setting that is protected by MobileTrust (mt), respectively. As the 
malfunctioning is detected with MobileTrust in place, the malicious nodes (Mmt) are denoted as 
untrustworthy, punished, and eventually expelled from the network based on (3). Thus, it holds 
that rt6 = r − ∑(u, ℎ 3& ≤ 0.4) . Based on (9), it is concluded that the 
malfunctioning which is caused by the malicious nodes for an unprotected setting, where Mup=M, 
can be higher as it holds that Mup≥Mmt.      ■ 
 
THEOREM 4.2. The MobileTrust’s mitigation rate is directly related with the user’s active 
participation in the crowdsourcing operations. 
PROOF. Let  ⊆ r denote the malicious nodes that exist in a road segment  ∈ r%c. The 
maximum volume of malicious notifications for a specific event entry e in rs is , =  . 
Consider a faulty event e for a rs. The event’s confidence Crs,e is given by (10): 
 , = 
,=   ∙ 
Z, − (1 − ) ∙ 
Z, −  ,  
(10) 
 
Based on (10), the malicious activity will be punished, if the erroneous notifications are below 
50%, thus if((1 − ) ∙ 
Z, +  ,) ≤ 0.5 ∙ . As the malfunction ratio (1-p) of 
the legitimate entities will be low, the higher the user participation the higher the difficulty and 
the effort for the attacker to avoid punishment.     ■ 
On the contrary, this also reflects the general limitation of the recommendation systems ([37], 
[38]). If the majority of the nodes are compromised (≈50%), such approaches cannot provide 
guarantees against colluding malicious attacks. Networks with so high volume of attackers are in 
general discarded ([20], [21], [22], [24], [34]). 
 
4.2.3 Attacker’s effort and user’s participation. 
LEMMA 4.2. MobileTrust increases the effort that is required in order to exploit the 
crowdsourcing system. 
PROOF. Based on THEOREM4.2, it is concluded that in order to perform an attack, one would 
need to marshal a high portion of colluding malicious user-accounts that cross a  ∈ r%c. As 
MobileTrust forces the colluding nodes to move around in order to avoid detection (step 6.c in 
subsection 3.1), the attacker cannot know in advance the passingrs nodes from the rs, and thus, 
he/she could not know if the malfunctioning will be detected by the CA during the evaluation of 
an event entry, or not. Therefore, the attacker could be burdened with a number of failed 
notifications. This fact will make the attacker to devote a significant effort in order to ensure that 
this single rs will be mistreated, straining the wile resources. On the other hand, the falsely 
accused legitimate users can retain their trustworthiness by their rewards from non-faulty 
segments.         ■ 
LEMMA 4.3. MobileTrust does not require the absolute cooperation from all users in order to 
report events with high confidence and effectively mitigate the attackers. 
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PROOF. Taking into account privacy issues and the user’s convenience, MobileTrust 
preconceives that users will not be always participating actively in the crowdsourcing activities. 
From THEOREM 4.2 it is derived that if the low volume of periodically malfunctioning legitimate 
modes along with the malicious ones do not constitute the majority, there exists a threshold of 
non-contributing users (NC-Userthr) where the system continues deducing the actual events’ status 
while retaining its capability in detecting/mitigating the erroneous functionality. ■ 
5 SIMULATION STUDY 
This section presents the simulation evaluation of MobileTrust and other related trust 
schemes(Vehicle Ad hoc network Reputation System (VARS) [20], Event-based Reputation 
System (ERS) [21], Trust Based Security Enhancement (TBSE) [22], and Social Network 
approach to Trust Management (SNTM) [24]) over a common setting for VANET 
communication, under normal operation and two attack scenarios. As the theoretical analysis 
results provoke, we test the MobileTrust’s defense effectiveness for different ratios of 
contributing/malicious nodes. 
5.1 Network Assumptions and Simulation Setup 
Regarding the network assumptions, this study concentrates on VANETs and other similar mobile 
ad hoc networks. Attacks on resource management are mainly studied. MobileTrust is modelled 
in the SUMO and is implemented in C++. As aforementioned, the assignment of the constant 
coefficients for the reputation and trust elements is based on relevant studies ([20], [21], [22], 
[24]) and in a previous analysis by the authors [37]. 
Fig. 4 illustrates the simulation test for the map of Eichstatt, a small size city with around 
13,000 citizens. The simulated area covers 4.5km×3.0km. For the evaluation of the different 
schemes, a VANET of 1500 nodes is modelled. The vehicles’ top speed varies from 18-80 km/h. 
There are utilized the propagation model two-ray ground reflection and the IEEE 802.11p [10] as 
the MAC layer. Each node has a 2Mbps raw bandwidth with 100m physical radio range. Table 1 
summarizes the simulation parameters. 
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Fig. 4. i) Simulation map of the German city Eichstatt in scale 1:1000m, ii) simulation snapshot of a road 
segment in scale 1:10m and iii) its projection on Google Maps. 
Table 1. Simulation Parameters of MobileTrust 
Parameter Value 
Number of Vehicles 1500 
Vehicle top speed (20% of vehicles for each speed value) [18, 36, 50, 60, 80] km/h 
Frequency 2400 MHz 
Path loss model Two ray ground 
MAC layer IEEE 802.11p 
Antenna height 1.5 m 
Transmission power 15 dbm 
Transmission range 100 m 
Type of antenna 360 degrees 
TxGain of antenna 1 
RxGain of antenna 1 
Fading channel Ricean 
Width of road 20 m 
 
The experiments include an initialization and an evaluation phase. At first, nodes start 
communicating with the default values of each scheme. Then, the normal operation and two 
attack scenarios are evaluated, measuring the overall performance and security, respectively. The 
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simulated period lasts 5 mins for each phase. Every experiment is performed10 times for each 
setting and the average measurements are reported. The randomly located nodes for the first 
evaluated system are recorded in order to use the exact same environment in all schemes. 
The first case examines the normal operation of each scheme, with no attacks taking place. Fig. 
4 depicts a snapshot from the simulation and its projection on Google maps. The different colors 
illustrate the maximum speed of the vehicles and the current average speed in each road segment. 
In general, as the processed data are spatial, the performance of MobileTrust can be affected by 
the density of the mobile nodes. Nevertheless, one of the main contributions of this paper is that 
the trust calculation can be distributed. Thus, if the same computational resources are devoted for 
every 13,000 citizens, the similar results will be concluded for medium-sized (50-100k residents) 
or even bigger (200-500k citizens) cities. 
Then, malicious nodes are introduced. For each different attack, 5 experiments are performed 
for 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 percentage of malicious nodes respectively (networks with higher 
volume of malicious entities are generally getting discarded in practice). 
5.2 Normal Operation 
In order to evaluate the trust systems under normal operation, we emulate around 100 traffic 
congestion events and 10 car crashes in each experiment. Two metrics estimate the performance 
and the energy consumption of each system. M1-1 measures the number of trust messages that are 
sent during normal operation, representing a rough estimation of the involving communication 
and computational overheads. M1-2 calculates the number of messages that are required in order to 
identify a road event, revealing the early notification capabilities of each scheme. For both 
metrics, the lower the value, the better. Fig. 5 illustrates the relevant metrics. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Performance evaluation results for the metrics M1-1 and M1-2. 
For M1-1, the MobileTrust authority receives one message by each involved vehicle. The rest 
P2P systems require a much higher number of messages in order to form the trust parameters, 
based on the information propagation scope. The SNTM’s closest node strategy has moderate 
performance while TBSE and VARS are less efficient. ERS requires the highest amount of 
interaction. 
For M1-2, the MobileTrust publishes instantly a new road event when it is reported by a trusted 
or a legitimate user with high event reputation along with the current confidence level. Then, it 
takes a decent amount of incoming contributions in order to notify the event with high confidence. 
The rest systems take several messages until a node obtains sufficient knowledge regarding the 
event’s occurrence. Moreover, as direct interaction gains higher weight when integrating direct 
and indirect knowledge, the nodes in the P2P schemes usually have to detect the event by direct 
observation before being able to reason about it with high confidence. Among these systems, 
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SNTM provides the earliest notification as indirect knowledge gives higher weight to the nodes 
that are closest to the event. TBSE, VARS, and ERS exhibit similar low performance. 
As is evident by the two metrics, MobileTrust is the most efficient system with effective early 
notification of road events. Nonetheless, MobileTrust’s performance is normally even better as 
public authorities can report several types of scheduled events, helping the drivers to avoid the 
relevant segments without requiring any further contribution from them. The actual performance 
of MobileTrust is measured in a preliminary implementation on real devices and is detailed in the 
next Section. 
5.3 Attack Scenarios 
In the first attack, the malicious nodes launch a social-based on-off attack. They cooperate at the 
initialization phase to gain high trust values, while at the evaluation phase they start injecting false 
notifications. We evaluate the effectiveness of the knowledge integration mechanism of each 
system in detecting bogus data and producing accurate notifications regarding the road state by 
measuring the volume of the false observations that are integrated by the trust system, defined as 
M2-1, and the number of false notifications that are made by the system, defined as M2-2. For both 
metrics, the lower the value, the better. Fig. 6 illustrates the evaluation metrics M2-1 and M2-2. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Security evaluation results for the metrics M2-1, M2-2, and M3. 
For M2-1, the single and centralized authority of MobileTrust collects a high volume of 
legitimate votes and thus is able to recognize the malicious entities and reject their contributions. 
As the attackers increase, the system may integrate a small number of bogus observations at the 
beginning of the attack phase. Nevertheless, the authority can detect the misbehaving nodes fast, 
even for a high volume of attackers (50%). All relevant schemes perform poorly for a large 
number of attackers (>40%). TBSE rejects a high volume of bogus observations for a low and 
moderate percent of attackers (10%-30%) due to its enhanced trust evaluation process. SNTM, 
ERS, and VARS exhibit the worst results in all cases. 
For M2-2, the central authority of MobileTrust reports only a small number of false notifications 
for a high volume of malicious nodes (50%). When many attackers participate in the attack 
(>40%) the relevant schemes perform badly, as they integrate a large number of bogus 
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observations (M2-1). TBSE produces moderate results for low to moderate attackers’ volumes 
(10%-30%) as it processes less malicious messages. SNTM, ERS, and VARS have the lowest 
performance across all attack setups. 
In the second scenario, the attackers exploit the ad hoc communication in order to perform 
rushing attacks by flooding messages and exhaust the resources of the other nodes. We estimate 
the robustness of the ad hoc communication against rushing attacks by calculating the number of 
flooding request messages that are processed by the legitimate nodes, defined as M3, the lower the 
value the better. We consider that all messages contain valid data (not erroneous). Fig. 6also 
illustrates the metric M3. 
In MobileTrust, the nodes can instantly recognize the involved road segments from the 
notification format and ignore irrelevant requests. As the nodes exchange only public information, 
they can reason when a specific notification has been just sent and they will not retransmit it as 
long as they remain inside the same road segment. Moreover, each node imposes a maximum 
number of responses in the current time-window. Thus, MobileTrust nodes will process a low 
volume of different requests, constraining the effectiveness and propagation of flooding. The P2P 
systems serve a high number of flooding requests under many colluding attackers. TBSE can 
degrade the flooding attack for a low to moderate volume of malicious participants (10%-20%) as 
it detects selfish behavior and ranks negatively the relevant nodes. SNTM and ERS also provide 
adequate defense against a small amount of misbehaving nodes (10%). VARS offers little 
protection. 
5.4 Security and Comparison with Other Systems 
As is evident by the above analysis, MobileTrust implements efficient and robust mechanisms for 
knowledge integration and ad hoc communication that outperform the current state of the art. The 
proposed system offers immunity-by-design against some types of threats and attacks. It is not 
vulnerable to information cascading and oversampling as only first-hand observations are 
evaluated by a single centralized entity. Moreover, badmouthing and ballot-stuffing attacks are 
not applicable as no third-party recommendations about trust are supported. As nodes either 
advertise their observations directly to the authority or broadcast the public notifications to the 
other cars, the deletion of transmitted messages is not applicable, in contrast to the P2P trust 
schemes. Regarding privacy, P2P communication does not disclose any vehicle information, 
while restricted anonymous usage is supported for the centralized interaction. Eavesdropping is 
also ineffective as the transmitted messages are either encrypted communication between the 
authority and the vehicles or publicly available data. 
The cryptographic solutions provide the mainstream security properties. Identity-based attacks 
(e.g. impersonation, newcomer, HELLO flooding, and Sybil attacks) are countered as the creator 
of each message is properly authenticated and evaluated. Session symmetric keys encrypt the 
transmitted data between the authority and the contributors, offering confidentiality and 
preventing information disclosure. The HMAC primitive enables integrity checks and detects 
message modification attempts. Random nonces are also included in the message data to avoid 
replay attacks. The system accomplishes non-repudiation regarding the actions of the authority 
and the knowledge contributors. Each entity performs a specific set of actions and role-based 
authorization is imposed for the central authority, the authenticated contributors, and the passive 
anonymous users. 
Moreover, automatic access control techniques (i.e. the plaintext notification identifiers) and 
back-off mechanisms degrade the effectiveness of DoS attacks. The low 
computational/communicational overheads for each task and edge computing further enhances 
protection. 
Table 2 summarizes the comparison results of MobileTrust and the 4 related schemes. 
MobileTrust: Secure Knowledge Integration in VANETs
 
 
 ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, Vol. 4, No. 2, Article 39. Publication date: October 
Table 2. Comparison of Trust
Feature MobileTrust
Architecture Hybrid
Trust scope Hybrid
Authentication YES 
Privacy YES 
Early notification YES 
Secure Communication YES 
6 IMPLEMENTATION 
This section presents the implementation details of MobileTrust on a smart city setting with a real 
vehicle. We evaluate the system’s performance under normal operation and measure the 
runtime overhead, which was sketched in the simulation study (subsection 5.2 Normal Operation).
6.1 The Car Installation 
A real smart car setting is deployed by the authors
infotainment, collects information of the vehicles electronic control units (ECU) via a Bluetooth
enabled OBD scan tool, and communicates to Internet, via a Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) connection, with a command
cloud. The research platform of GRNET Virtual MAchines (ViMA)
computing. The VMs of the cloud service are monitored through a laptop. The emulated scenario 
implements the European Union’s road safety system eCall [
accidents and automatically informs the involved emergency services. Fig. 
setting. 
Fig. 7. 
In this paper, we further extend this deployment in order to implement MobileTrust and model 
the event types that are described in Section 3. The in
application, running in the smart phone, and the 
6.2 Testbed 
                                                                
5GRNET ViMA: https://vima.grnet.gr/about/info/en/ 
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40], where the system detects car 
7 depicts the smart car 
 
Smart car deployment. 
-vehicle component is an Android 
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Under this setting, a testbed was evaluated on a VM (Intel Core i7 at 2.1 GHz CPU, 8GB RAM, 
64-bit OS Windows 8.1 Pro), where 1000
the response time of MobileTrust in ms for the smart phone client application and the central 
authority at the backend, with spikes depicting TLS processing. The additional communication 
delay through GSM was on average 1-4 
internal components is summarized in Table 3.
cryptographic services and exhibit similar results.
Fig. 8. Response time of MobileTrust applications in ms.
Table 3. Resource Consumption of MobileTtrust components
Component 
Cryptographic service 
TLS handshake 
TLS session 
RSA-2048 sign 
RSA-2048 verify 
AES-256 in CBC  
SHA512 
Trust scheme 
Reputation estimation (per node) 
Trust computation (per node) 
Event evaluation 
Event confidence calculation (per 500 nodes in a road segment)
6.3 Parallelization in GPUs 
As aforementioned, the core knowledge integration mechanism of MobileTrust can be 
parallelized in a fine-grained manner. Except from the CPU parallelization on multiple core, the 
GPUs is a well-tried practice that can drastically reduce the processing time in computation 
intensive operations. Recommendation systems perform well in this setting with 
speedup [38]. In this study, we utilize the CUDA General Purpose GPU (GPGPU) in order to 
parallelize the MobileTrust algorithm. The GPU
 George Hatzivasilis et al.
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 event notifications where advertised. Fig. 8 illustrates 
seconds. The processing resource consumption of the 
The V2V interactions also include the referred 
 
 
 
 
RAM [KB] CPU [ms] 
  
1400 692.8 
65 30.45 
6.1 3.229 
3.2 0.117 
3.4 0.004 
2.4 0.009 
  
0.08 – 1.1 3.4 - 54.48 
1.4 0.4 
  
 1.5 0.14 
30-32 times 
-accelerated deployment is implemented on the 
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same machine as the CPU version, equipped with the NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1050 GPU (640 
cores, 2GB buffer, 6Gbps memory speed, 1.4 GHz clock). 
Consider the most frequent and resource demanding traffic congestion events for road 
segments with 500 vehicles on average. After the event’s active period, the event’s confidence 
must be evaluated (see Table 3). Then, the reputation histories and the trust structures of the 500 
users must be updated. Fig. 9 depicts the average processing time of evaluating a road event for 
the CPU, CPU-accelerated, and GPU-accelerated versions of MobileTrust. With the parallel 
processing on 4 CPU cores (8 threads), each thread processes one event for a specific road 
segment and updates the users’ data. The CPU parallelism busts performance by 23% in 
comparison with the single CPU version. This CPU-accelerated implementation is further 
improved by parallelizing the users’ data update in the GPU (500 cores of 560KB each). This 
setting is around 32 times faster than the single CPU one, and can serve 1.16 events per second. 
The optimized proposal can be deployed by every VM in both cloud and MEC architectures, 
providing an overall efficient and globally scalable system with real-time response. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Processing time of MobileTrust versions in ms. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this work MobileTrust – a trust-based resource sharing system for VANETs is presented. The 
system is modelled in the SUMO simulator along with 4 relevant schemes and a comparative 
analysis is conducted. MobileTrust is an energy efficient solution that provides the higher level of 
protection. On real embedded devices in the context of an emulated VANET and smart city CPS, 
the overhead of the trust scheme is low and acceptable for the added security and the overall 
protection level that it is achieved. 
One limitation for MobileTrust and all the relevant systems concerns the accuracy of the 
location positioning system [41]. For example, the discrimination of the different lanes in a road 
section may not be possible. Thus, if only one lane faces a specific event (i.e. traffic jam), the 
notification and rating mechanisms can produce erroneous results. Nevertheless, these issues will 
be contained as the Global Positioning System (GPS) technology is evolved and integrated with 
5G pioneering frequency communications (such as 26 and 60GHz). 
As future extensions of our work, we consider the further inclusion of modern smart 
transportation technologies and circular economy business models. The goal is to extend the trust 
mechanism in order to evaluate application specific features for ecosystems that provide 
operations like ride service hailing and car-sharing. 
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